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Beckett, Medicine and the Brain: 
Introduction 
 
Elizabeth Barry, Ulrika Maude and Laura Salisbury 
 
 
When Samuel Beckett’s library was opened up to scholars, it gave some sense of the extraordinary 
amount of material that had been funnelled into the development of that writer so famed for his 
minimalism. Alongside an extensive array of books that spoke to his literary interests, there were texts 
suggestive of medical and scientific concerns, a number of dictionaries and the eleventh edition of 
Encyclopaedia Britannica. Some sections of the encyclopaedia were clearly marked by Beckett, and 
there is a folded page that suggests an entry over which the he may have lingered: “Brain”. Beckett did 
dog-ear pages in books that interested him, though there is no way of knowing definitively if he was 
the one who pressed down this page; still, Dirk Van Hulle and Mark Nixon note somewhat 
conservatively that “Brain” “could conceivably have interested Beckett” (Van Hulle and Nixon 2013, 
193). Indeed: as this issue of the Journal of Medical Humanities demonstrates, the brain and its 
functioning was of abiding, particular interest to Beckett. Scholars now know that Beckett took 
extensive notes (held in Trinity College Dublin) on contemporary psychology and psychoanalysis in 
the 1930s; he also read medical text books and the neurological conditions they detailed with more 
attention than one would expect from a casually interested amateur. But then, there was nothing casual 
about Beckett’s anatomising of the mind and body in his work. From the 1930s, when he began to 
write creatively in a sustained fashion, until the final parched utterances of the 1980s, the tensely 
discordant relationship between mind and body, and the functioning of the brain – the site where mind 
and body are most insistently implicated – remain key thematic interests for Beckett and motors that 
produce an extraordinary push and pull on the form of his texts. It is indeed hard to think of a non-
medically-trained writer who has returned more insistently to the phenomenological experience of 
disorder and the technical language of neurological and psychological dysfunction. Equally, it is hard 
to think of another writer who has a stronger sense of the potential of disorder and dysfunction to scuff 
up the window of internal representation that, in health, can render our experience so smoothly 
continuous, so transparent, that one only looks through it rather than at it. Like scratches on a pane of 
glass, Beckett’s articulations of disorder and disease work to denude experience of its occulting 
clarity, as they render grittily explicit the uncomfortable disjunctions between idea and expression, 
mind and body, free will and automaticity, continuity and rupture, endurance and senescence, that are 
as much a part of human experience as the evenness of wellbeing.  
 Born in 1906, it is perhaps not surprising that Beckett was engaged by the ways in which the 
mind was becoming increasingly linked to the functioning of cerebral matter and an extended nervous 
system. In the 1860s, neurology had already determined that language, and perhaps even the thought it 
seemed to subtend, might be localized within particular areas of the cortex (see Salisbury and Code, 
xxx), while by the 1870s, the nervous system had been firmly reconceived as something that worked 
according to reflex functions – material impulses that had themselves been ‘clocked’ at between 35 
and 45 metres per second in 1867. In 1879, psychology definitively followed the lead of the natural 
and physical sciences in their models of systematized experimentation, observation and the meticulous 
recording of accumulated data, when Wilhelm Wundt founded the first active psychological laboratory 
in Leipzig – a move mirrored by William James’s establishment of the Harvard Psychological 
Laboratory in America. Earlier psychological study had been dependent upon introspection and 
philosophical models of self-analysis, with psychology mostly undertaken literally as psyche logos, the 
study of the soul. But as Beckett read in the 1930s when he undertook a meticulous study of 
contemporary schools of psychology and psychoanalysis, the research in Wundt’s psychological 
laboratory definitively moved away from introspection towards the study of performance as well as 
experience: “The question up for investigation might be how quickly [a subject] could react, or how 
accurately he could perceive, or how completely he could recall material he had memorized; […] he 
was not asked to report his experience during the task, but simply to perform his task’ (Woodworth 
1931, 10). Psychophysics, in particular, refused introspection or a philosophy of memory in favour of 
constructing thought – that which is most essential to the self – as a material function within an 
objectively analysable system.  
Psychoanalysis, which emerged from nineteenth-century neurology but split into its own 
discipline at the beginning of the twentieth century, turned to a topographical account of the 
functioning of the mind in the face of the difficulty of converting the developing science of brain 
centres and nerve pathways into a model of mental functioning that could account for the complexity 
of psychological disorder. But a bridge between experimental psychology, neurology and 
psychoanalysis remained in a shared insistence that the mind was determinedly linked to 
neurophysiology and structured according to scientifically analysable systems of functioning over 
which the self had profoundly limited conscious control. Alongside many other twentieth-century 
writers, then, Beckett was an inheritor of the idea that the conscious human subject was never strictly 
coterminous with or “at home” to itself. Beckett, however, was to make conscious use of the newly 
anatomised automaticity of much mental functioning, alongside both the hyperassociative and 
dissociative qualities of mental illness and the compulsive corporeality of the neurologically 
disordered body. For Beckett, what the new sciences of the brain offered were languages and striking 
symptoms that precisely interrogated the human subject’s hold on its prized categories of free will, 
intention and rationality.        
From the beginning, critical analyses of Beckett’s work have pursued the intuition that an 
ungraspable mind and its troubled relationship to an unruly a body was Beckett’s primary material. 
This placed the brain centre stage, and as Beckett’s work from the late 1950s through the 1960s 
persistently affirmed, if one were to demand precise coordinates for his imagined white cylinders, 
rotundas and strangely abstracted non-spaces, the only rather occluding response the texts could offer 
would be that “we are, needless to say, in a skull” (Beckett 1995, 70). In the 1960s, criticism certainly 
interpreted Beckett’s skullscapes as affirming a broadly existentialist humanist sense that Beckett was 
concerned with portraying the human mind thrown back on itself, stripped of the normative social 
habits that mask its uninhabitable strangeness. This loosely psychological mode was consolidated and 
extended in the next few decades as critics of various theoretical schools undertook detailed and 
revealing readings of both the content and form of Beckett’s work in relation to specifically 
psychoanalytic ideas. Anxious to understand the movements, enactments and articulations of the texts 
rather than simply to psychoanalyze either author or characters, many scholars produced rich analyses 
of the performance of modes and drives within the work – modes, it turned out, that could usefully be 
understood through the ideas of psychoanalysis, even though they could not happily be reduced to 
them.  
During the 1990s, however, critics such as Jean-Michel Rabaté, Phil Baker and J. D. O’Hara 
began to note the odd specificity of terms relating to neurological and psychological dysfunction that 
seemed to creep into Beckett’s texts. And a new path for those interested in Beckett’s particular 
reworking of the raw materials of brain and mind was broken when, in his biography Damned to Fame 
(1996), James Knowlson revealed a cache of notes on psychology and psychoanalysis that Beckett had 
taken between 1934 and 1935 when he started psychotherapy with Wilfred R. Bion. Beckett worked 
with Bion as a way of addressing his own disabling though putatively psychosomatic symptoms that, 
from a contemporary point of view, resemble those of an anxiety disorder. Though his typed notes 
suggest an attempt to gain an intellectual, abstract understanding of mental and neurological 
functioning, they also bear witness to a sense of anxious recognition of his own psychological and 
somatic difficulties. Without wishing to reduce Beckett’s engagement with psychology and neurology 
to pathography, it is nevertheless vital to note that Beckett was as interested in the phenomenological 
experience and affective consequences of disorder as he was in understanding the mind and body as 
systematically connected. 
It is, we think, worth documenting the contents of Beckett’s “Psychology Notes” – notes to 
which the author, either consciously or not, returned throughout his writing career. They begin with 
transcriptions from the Bloomsbury psychoanalyst Karin Stephen’s Psychoanalysis and Medicine: A 
Study of the Wish to Fall Ill (1933) that explore Freudian theory, while Freud’s own New Introductory 
Lectures on Psychoanalysis are précised under the heading of “Id, Ego & Superego”. R. S. 
Woodworth’s Contemporary Schools of Psychology (1931) seems to offer Beckett a technical 
overview of a field in its account of late nineteenth-century experimental psychology, behaviorism 
(including the work of Watson, Thorndike and Pavlov), neurological theories of the localization of 
functions in the brain, the Gestalt psychology whose terms make their way into the early novel 
Murphy, and accounts of the psychoanalytic theories of Alfred Adler and Jung. Beckett’s knowledge 
of Freudian theory is extended by his reading of Ernest Jones’s Papers on Psychoanalysis (1923), 
while subsequent notes on Jones’s Treatment of Neuroses (1920) and its material on conversion 
hysteria and the psychogenic causes of physical ailments contain levels of detail and sardonic personal 
ejaculations that suggest some sort of identification with the symptoms presented. Wilhelm Stekel’s 
Psychoanalysis and Suggestion Therapy (1923) is quickly condensed by Beckett into a few useful 
terms (including “[a]cathisia, i.e., inability to sit down”, which appears in the figure of Cooper in 
Murphy), but Alfred Adler’s The Neurotic Constitution (1921) is attended to in far greater detail, with 
its descriptions of how the neurotic’s will is both narcissistically engorged as a will to power and 
paralysed in symptoms. Beckett’s final notes on Otto Rank’s The Trauma of Birth (1929) follow in 
detail the thesis that all neurosis is an expression of the trauma of birth as the baby is expelled from 
intrauterine calm, from the realm of pure pleasure, into the world. For Rank, as for Freud, the pleasure 
principle and the death drive are folded into one another, with pleasure’s aim to return the organism to 
the state of quiescence that precedes birth compellingly elided with an unconscious fantasy of the 
experience of death. Beckett had already explored an idea of a “wombtomb” before reading Rank, but 
knowing that Beckett preserved Rank’s technical account of the drives that underpin a feeling that 
implicates birth and death and finds a sense of rapturous extinction in a never quite to be inhabited 
nothing, does assist the critical work that would seek to understand how and why particular drives and 
demands occupy such a central place in Beckett’s texts. 
Beckett also had a more wide-ranging interest in medicine and medical discoveries. In addition 
to works on psychology and psychoanalysis, he read more general medical textbooks, such as Sir 
Willam Osler’s highly influential The Principles and Practice of Medicine, which was translated into a 
number of languages and ran into many editions. From Osler’s chapter on alcoholism, Beckett adopted 
the word “cyanosis”, the reddening of the face which is a symptom of chronic alcoholism. The term 
recurs in a number of Beckett’s works (see Beckett 2014, 103). From Pierre Garnier’s anti-
masturbation publication, Onanisme seul et a deux sous toutes ses forms et leurs consequences, which 
Beckett read in Trinity College Dublin library in 1931 in the book’s ninth or tenth edition, Beckett 
picked up strands of narrative, curious terminology, and an emphasis on the mechanical nature of 
sexuality, which, as Yoshiki Tajiri has noted, is often likened to “pistons, cylinders and switches” in 
his early writing (Tajiri 195). Hypersexuality, in particular, figures prominently in Beckett’s early 
prose works, Dream of Fair to Middling Women (completed 1932; published 1992) and More Pricks 
than Kicks (1934). He also read Max Nordau’s Degeneration, and from it he acquired details about 
neurological conditions such as Tourette’s syndrome and male hysteria, which Jean-Martin Charcot 
(1825-1893), who had been Nordau’s tutor, had researched intensively in the last 15 years of his life.  
Beckett’s interest in medicine is part of the wider engagement modernist writers had with 
medical culture. James Joyce, with whom Beckett had a close personal friendship, and whose work 
profoundly influenced the young Beckett, began the study of medicine three times during his life, but 
on each occasion he abandoned his studies. Unsurprisingly, medical ideas greatly influenced Joyce’s 
work, especially his most famous novel, Ulysses (1922). In the Gilbert and the Linata schemata of the 
novel, Joyce gave most of the episodes their own “organ”, which include “kidney”, “genitals”, “heart”, 
“lung”, “brain” and “nerves”. The organ of “The Oxen of the Sun” episode of Ulysses is the 
womb/uterus. The episode combines a focus on the development of the English language with a 
parodic narrative of human gestation and is set in Holles Street National Maternity Hospital in Dublin. 
In 1920, during the writing of the episode, Joyce drew a gestation chart to which he added nine notes 
on foetal development (now held in the Cornell University Library Joyce Collection). The episode 
playfully satirizes gendered attitudes towards childbirth, but also has a more serious undertone: in the 
background, throughout the novel, looms Bloom and Molly’s dead child, Rudy, victim of the “infant 
mortality” mentioned in the episode. The presence of Rudy here and elsewhere in the novel attests to 
the gravity with which Joyce’s novel critiques the gendered nature of the medical culture of the day. 
For while rapid progress had been made in numerous fields of medicine, others, such as obstetrics, 
lagged behind, partly because childbirth was seen as the domain of midwives, and hence unworthy of 
the attention of male surgeons. Infant mortality in Ireland in particular was scandalously high, and 
Joyce’s work can be seen as paradigmatic of the way in which modernist literature, although formally 
drawing on a number of medical advances, simultaneously in its thematic focus challenges some of the 
assumptions of medicine’s broader practical culture.  
Medicine, and in particular neurology and psychiatry, were also crucial to the development of 
surrealism. A number of the key surrealists, including André Breton, Theodore Fraénkel, Louis 
Aragon and Max Beckman, had either studied psychiatry or had worked as doctors or orderlies in the 
medical services during the Great War, and they would have had first-hand experience of brain-injured 
and shell-shocked soldiers. Language pathology therefore had its role to play in the development of 
surrealism, and Beckett had an intimate knowledge of surrealist literature. In 1928, he translated “The 
Fiftieth Anniversary of Hysteria,” by Louis Aragon and André Breton, which advocated hysteria not 
as “a pathological phenomenon” but as “a supreme form of expression” (Aragon and Breton 1978, 
321). Between 1929 and 1932, Beckett translated many more surrealist texts for the modernist little 
magazine, transition, for Nancy Cunard’s Negro Anthology (1934), and most importantly, for the 
“Surrealist Number” of the journal This Quarter 5:1, published in 1932. Over fifty pages of the 
journal’s two hundred odd pages were translated by Beckett (Sardin and Germoni 2011, 740). Among 
the texts Beckett translated during this period are passages of The Immaculate Conception by Breton 
and Paul Éluard, in which the essays simulate mental illnesses for literary effect, “maladies virtual in 
each one of us [that] could replace most advantageously the ballad, the sonnet, the epic, the poem 
without head or tail, and other decrepit modes” (Breton and Éluard 1978, 51). For the surrealists, 
mental illness liberated language from convention, in turn enabling the linguistic experimentation 
endemic to modernist writing.  
 
Beckett’s engagement with the work of the surrealists reflects his own preoccupation with the 
involuntary nature of much language use both in pathology and in everyday life. While medical 
conditions arguably have a more subtle and complex relationship to linguistic style in his own work 
than that of his surrealist counterparts, there is there a common understanding of the embodied nature 
of writing, and the arbitrary nature of the line between pathology and health. The first article of this 
issue opens up some of these concerns. Russell Smith’s piece reflects the recent turn towards affect 
and emotion in literary studies, focusing on the neglected topic of anger in Beckett’s work. Beckett 
once said memorably “[a]ll I am is feeling”; emotion is at once central to his writing, and strangely 
elusive there, confounding attempts to harness it to the lyrical or the intersubjective. To balance other 
readings in this issue that engage with what might be called the pathological mind in Beckett’s work, 
Smith refutes the idea that rage is a clinical symptom there, reading it rather as a drive or compulsion 
that might yield psychic pleasure as well as harm. Anger even, he suggests, may be a component of 
well-being, as it appears in Aristotle and other Greek thought. Reading Beckett in the light of these 
depathologizing accounts of anger, as well as the psychoanalyst Alfred Adler’s notion of the 
“masculine protest” (Beckett, as we have seen, took notes from Adler’s two volumes, The Neurotic 
Constitution and Individual Psychology, in the 1930s), Smith distinguishes in Beckett’s work and 
elsewhere the conflicting energies of the (constructive) thymos, or will-to power, and the irritation and 
compensatory neurotic ‘superiority’ that impose inaction – the latter condition familiar from Moran’s 
narrative in  Molloy in particular, but encountered frequently in the trilogy. Countering this irritable 
mode, Smith argues, can be found a syntax of rage (rather than the more familiar weakness) operating 
throughout the trilogy, an implacable energy born of liberated and even heroic anger.  
Rina Kim’s article also explores the perplexing presentation of emotion in Beckett’s work. For 
Kim, Beckett’s brain is resolutely material, and she traces the implications of this for his articulation 
of feeling. She reflects on his interest in the ‘gaps’ in brain structure – the  “synaptic chasm” he talked 
about to Lawrence Shainberg (Shainberg 1987, 102) – and draws an analogy with the centrality of 
discontinuities and absences in his own aesthetic practice. The article also argues that what Lois 
Oppenheim has called the “biological accuracy” (Oppenheim 2005, 80) of Beckett’s writing makes it 
productive to read representations of both consciousness and brain pathology in his work in the light 
of recent discoveries in neuroscience. We can in this way identify his prescience and the nature of his 
insights into the relations between material brain (the “liquefied brain” to which Becket alludes in The 
Unnamable) and conscious and unconscious ‘mind’. Kim notes that Beckett’s exploration – ironic and 
otherwise – of the biological basis of emotion pre-empts the claims of psychoanalytic interpretation, 
something that Piette will go on to situate historically in relation to the competing disciplines within 
what might broadly be termed “brain science”.   
Exploring a more sinister dimension to the “liquefied brain”, Adam Piette opens up a dramatic 
moment in the history of material treatment of the mind, exploring the foray Beckett’s post-war trilogy 
makes into physical and mental realms (the psychiatric institution, the mind of the lobotomy patient) 
that chime with key aspects of the historical and political moment of writing. If the Trilogy appears to 
move away from politics as its subject breaks down, or is broken down, under psychiatric treatment, to 
write of brutal and extreme psychiatric practice in the late 1940s is, as Piette argues, necessarily to 
engage with politics – in the shape of the political uses of psychosurgery during the Cold War. The 
striking imagery of lobotomy in Malone Dies and in particular The Unnamable, where the skull wall is 
pierced, drilled, and lights shone in on the protagonist’s mind, sits uncomfortably but resonantly 
alongside a subject whose words are judged and punished, but who can no longer remember his 
crimes. His radically material treatment is an assault not only on the Freudian unconscious – drives 
and desires he cannot consciously summon – but also the psychoanalytic method that might uncover it 
through intersubjective ‘talk’ – a conflict being played out in the history of the time, when 
psychosurgery was seen as a brutal corrective to the “suspiciously elaborate” and potentially 
subversive practice of depth psychoanalysis.  
Next, the collection features a dialogue between a psychiatrist (Matthew Broome) and creative 
practitioner (Jonathan Heron) that explores as its context a psychiatry as far as one can be from the 
brutal and repressive psychiatric methods of the Cold War. The impulse behind this intellectual and 
ethical conversation is a reflection on two models of understanding the patient as subject – the 
ideographic, whereby the person is seen an irreducible and unique event, and the nomothetic, where 
the clinician (in this case) relies on general laws to understand them (Broome 2008) – and the way in 
which Beckett’s theatre might allow for an exploration of both modes. These ways of encountering 
another individual originate in the philosophy of Wilhelm Windelband, which Beckett read and 
transcribed in the 1930s, and – as this dialogue demonstrates – are thematized in Beckett’s 1976 play 
Rough for Theatre II. If the Cold War psychiatric subject is reduced to dumb materiality by the most 
invasive means, the subject in Beckett’s play is victim of a very different treatment: a cold detachment 
which reduces the living subject to a collection of documents and a handful of questionable symptoms 
and classifications. In both cases, the affective dimension of treatment is lost, and with it a rich source 
of understanding – an understanding that the methods of practical theatre and performance analysis 
can, as this dialogue shows, bring to life. Beckett’s use of the theatrical mode itself invokes two 
processes within theatre practice and analysis analogous to the ideographic and the nomethetic: the 
phenomenological and the semiotic, whereby a production may be conceived in terms of the nervous 
system of the actors and audience, or of the system of signs in which the disembodied ‘object’ of the 
play consists. The silent body in Beckett’s play – the documented subject standing at a window and 
contemplating suicide – is both sign and subject of a suffering that he and the audience must stare in 
the face.  
In another article that considers Beckett’s work in relation to the philosophy of psychiatry, 
Elizabeth Barry returns to the vexed question of the relationship between Beckett’s work and the 
condition of schizophrenia. Putting aside existing approaches such as Beckett’s reflection of the idea 
of schizophrenia as cultural symbol, or the putative connections between the language of Lucky or the 
Unnamable and the schizoid patient, this article focuses on the disruption to ipseity, the pre-reflective 
self-awareness that Beckett (after Nordau) identied as coenaesthesis, that Beckett’s characters – in 
common with those with schizophrenia – appear to suffer, and the cognitive, somatic and perceptual 
effects of such a disruption. Like Kim, Barry explores the significance of this pre-reflective level of 
consciousness for Beckett’s presentation of self. The writer’s work, Barry suggests, offers a subjective 
perspective on experiences that could be seen to characterize psychotic illness – a perspective that 
points to underlying links between the affective aspects of the condition and the deficits it often 
produces in attention, memory and time perception. It might be fruitful, she argues, for the student of 
Beckett to think about how philosophers of psychiatry describe linguistic self-reference under the 
pressure of psychosis, descriptions that might be compared productively to those in Beckett’s mature 
work. Beckett’s writing, in turn, might offer imaginative models that would assist clinicians in 
understanding schizophrenia as a disorder of self, as much recent philosophy of psychiatry has tried to 
encourage, and in so doing help them to make sense of its assault not only on affect and 
communication, but also on cognitive and perceptual function.  
 The penultimate article opens up concerns with the nature of language and agency that 
are central to the issue as a whole. Considering Beckett in relation to two very different thinkers with 
whom he was familiar, Henri Bergson and Samuel Johnson, Ulrika Maude explores the concerns of all 
three with habitual, automatic and involuntary behaviour. Beckett’s reading of Nordau is again critical 
in this regard, Nordau’s concern with ‘degeneracy’ sharing the preoccupations of nineteenth century 
neurologists with involuntary behaviour as manifested in conditions such as Tourette’s syndrome. For 
all of these writers, the human is, as Maude puts it, “inflicted by the mechanical”, not only in the grip 
of language pathologies that impose automatisms of speech, but in their everyday utterances and 
behaviour. Johnson was for Beckett not only a model stylist (if one inflicted with something of the 
mechanical, a “wit and wisdom machine” (Beckett, cited in Smith 2002, 115)), but also a specimen of 
fascination as a man – a man whose obsessions and verbal and physical tics were for Beckett as 
eloquent as his witticisms. While Bergson contests the “recalcitrance of matter” and the habitual as it 
encroaches upon speech and gesture, Beckett can be seen to embrace this tendency, finding in it some 
truth about the fundamental limitations of our intentionality in relation to language, behavior and 
thought.   
Finally, in a second pairing of humanities scholar and scientist, Laura Salisbury (a literary 
critic) and Chris Code (a neuropsychologist) return to the theme of linguistic automatism, probing the 
connections between Beckett’s writing and those models of language and language disorder that 
challenge the idea that linguistic ability underpines the human’s status as rational animal. They look in 
particular at the theories of the late nineteenth-century neurologist John Hughlings Jackson, whose 
work on the neurological underpinnings of language chimes compellingly with Beckett’s creative 
explorations of involuntary and disordered language, and experiences akin to aphasia, a condition with 
which Beckett was intimately familiar. They suggest that Beckett’s work is in dialogue – unwitting or 
otherwise – with that of Hughlings Jackson in so far as it is particularly attuned to aspects and uses of 
language that might be seen to be automatic and non-propositional – and to language’s connection 
with the fragile materiality of the brain, also examined here in different contexts by Kim, Maude and 
Piette. Operating in the space between “I can’t” and “I must”, as Salisbury and Code put it (after 
Beckett) – Beckett’s work invokes both the “incompleteness” and the emotionally charged 
“modalizing” compulsions of the aphasic speaker, and translates both into an aesthetic which 
challenges the certainties of knowledge while preserving an affective and expressive power.  
As this and the other articles in this issue show, the scope of Beckett’s exploration of functions 
and dysfunctions of the brain works as a way of asking fundamental questions of the contours and 
limits of selfhood and representation.1 By drawing together scholars, practitioners and clinicians 
interested in investigating how Beckett’s use of neurological and psychological discourses shapes his 
work, while exploring how the aesthetic experiences those texts produce might help us to understand, 
explore and contain the complexity of the subjective experience of illness and disorder, this special 
issue hopes to tease out how Beckett’s particular knotting of the language of brain science and of art 












                                                     
1 This special issue represents a body of work that emerged from a year-long programme of interdisciplinary 
events on the topic of Beckett and Brain Science funded by the UK’s Arts and Humanities Research Council. 
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